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Constitutional

LaW-IRREBUTTABLE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION OF STUDENT
NON-RESIDENCY HELD VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENT-

Vlandis v. Kline, 93 S. Ct. 2230 (1973).

In the past the durational residence requirement has been subject to
constitutional challenge under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.1 When coupled with an irrebuttable statutory presumption of non-residency as in Vlandis v. Kline,2 the durational residence
requirement displays a further fourteenth amendment vulnerability-the
contravention of procedural due process.'
Durational residence requirements have traditionally been justified
upon the grounds that they provide objective evidence of domiciliary intent and hence separate the bona fide resident from the transient. The
bona fide resident, or domiciliary, is accorded greater rights and privileges5
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
1. "No State shall ...
the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. 93 S. Ct. 2230 (1973), aff'g 346 F. Supp. 526 (D. Conn. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
Viandis].
3. "No State shall. . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. The term "residence", when used in its technical sense, is indicative of inhabitance only,
without domiciliary intent, whereas the term "domicile" denotes physical presence in a given
jurisdiction concomitant with the intent to remain there. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLINTS OF LAW §§ 11-23 (1971); 28 C.J.S. Domicile § 9 (1941). However, "the terms "domicile" and "residence", as used in statutes, are commonly, although not necessarily, construed
as synonymous." 28 C.J.S. Domicile § 2(b) (1941). Virginia courts have looked to legislative
purpose and to context in determining the meaning of the words in a particular setting; see
Cooper's Adm'r v. Commonwealth, 121 Va. 338, 93 S.E. 680 (1917). "Reside", as used in the
fourteenth amendment, was early interpreted to mean bona fide residence, i.e. domicile. See
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 80 (1872).
5. He may vote in state elections, obtain a professional license, seek a divorce in the state's
courts.
Voting is now classified as a fundamental right, sheltered by stringent equal protection
standards. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Carrington v.
Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Reynolds v.. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299 (1941); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
Carringtonv. Rash, supra, like Vlandis involved a permanent, irrebuttable presumption
of non-residence. The 1965 decision held that statute violative of the equal protection clause,
as it infringed upon the fundamental right to vote. Education, under San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Rodriguez], is not
a fundamental right and thus is not sheltered by the "new" equal protection. See note 14
infra and accompanying text.
Statutes restricting the availability of professional licenses via a durational residence law
are also vulnerable to fourteenth amendment attack. Under the due process clause, a state
must demonstrate some rational connection between its professional licensing criteria and the
competent practice of the regulated profession. See Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971);
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S.
252 (1957).
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than the out-of-stater, among them eligibility for lower tuition rates at the
state's publicly-funded colleges and universities.' The state's right to discriminate between resident and non-resident students for tuition purposes
has withstood equal protection challenge7 when tested under the conventional "rational relationship" standard; s the Vlandis appellees, 9 precluded
As for state jurisdiction over divorce, "each State is the sole judge of the marital status of
its citizens, and it alone has the exclusive right to say upon what grounds or for what causes
such status may be dissolved or modified." Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 24 (1903).
Accord, Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901).
The constitutionality of a durational residence law was challenged in Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371 (1971), wherein the Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment prohibited a state from denying an indigent access to its divorce tribunals. See
Note, Domicile as a ConstitutionalRequirement for Divorce Jurisdiction,44 IowA L. REv. 765
(1959).
6. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 23-7 (1973 Supp.). Virginia maintains a state university system
which charges her out-of-state students a higher tuition, according the lower rate only to such
person who "is and has been domiciled in Virginia for a period of at least one year prior to
the commencement of the term, semester, or quarter for which any . . . reduced tuition
charge is sought ....
" A heavy burden of proof is placed upon the newly-arrived Virginian
who seeks to prove his bona fide residency and thus qualify for the lower rate. He must, if
over eighteen, establish that he abandoned his previous domicile and moved to Virginia, with
the intent of remaining there permanently after graduation, at least one year prior to the date
upon which he seeks reclassification. If under eighteen, he must, in addition to the foregoing,
show that he was an emancipated minor at the time of his entry into the state. "The burden
of establishing these matters by convincing evidence is on the person alleging them." Id.
7. See Clarke v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Iowa 1966), aft'd, 406 F.2d 883 (8th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 862 (1969) (tuition differential at University of Iowa justified on
grounds of past tax contributions by residents); Landwehr v. Regents of Univ. of Colorado,
156 Colo. 1, 396 P.2d 451 (1964) (court refused to interfere with legislative decision to distinguish between residents and non-residents for tuition purposes).
8. Conventional, less stringent equal protection standards necessitate only a finding of:
[Slome rational relationship to a legitimate state end . . . . [D]istinctions drawn
by a challenged statute . . . will be set aside as violative of the Equal Protection
Clause only if based on reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit of that goal. Legislatures are presumed to have acted constitutionally . . . . [T]heir statutory classificatons will be set aside only if no grounds can be conceived to justify them. McDonald
v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969), citing McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961), Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947)
and Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
The traditional equal protection standard here enunciated by former Chief Justice Warren
is superseded and the more stringent doctrine invoked upon the infringement of a "basic,
fundamental right". 394 U.S., supra at 807. The issue is thus seen to devolve upon the
determination of what rights are to be termed fundamental, and thus worthy of the most
exacting judicial scrutiny.
9. Vlandis details the case of appellee Margaret Kline, a California student who became
the wife of a life-long Connecticut resident. The Klines established a permanent home in
Storrs, Connecticut; Mrs. Kline obtained a Connecticut driver's license and automobile registration and registered to vote in that state. Appellee Catapano, an unmarried graduate
student, applied for admission to the University of Connecticut from Ohio, where she then
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from invoking the more stringent equal protection standard,10 direct the
-Court's attention to a procedural weakness of Connecticut's tuition differential system.
Under Connecticut law, a "resident" student is eligible for a lower tuition rate at state-supported colleges and universities." To distinguish the
bona fide resident from the transient, a durational residence requirement
is employed. 2 Vandis puts in issue the evidentiary means by which Connecticut may deny the status of "resident" to the newly-arrived student.
By statute, the residential status of the student is fixed at the time of his
application for admission and is conclusively presumed to continue
throughout the period of his attendance at the university. 3 During this
period, the student was not permitted to change his classification to "resident" even if he had actually satisfied the definitional requirements of
state citizenship. The Viandis Court, avoiding a confrontation between
durational residence requirements and the equal protection clause, held
the conclusive presumption violative of due process of law.
The Supreme Court's conscription of the due process clause as ratio
decidendi was perhaps a necessary consequence of its earlier holding in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez. 4 Rodriguez ruled that
resided. After receiving word of her admission to the state university, she moved from Ohio
to Connecticut. Like Mrs. Kline, she has a Connecticut driver's license; her car is registered
in Connecticut, and she is a Connecticut voter. Appellant Vlandis, Director of Admissions at
the University of Connecticut, irreversibly classified both Miss Catapano and Mrs. Kline as
out-of-state students pursuant to the challenged statute.
10. See note 14, infra and accompanying text.
11. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-329b (1969), as amended Pub. Act No. 5, § 122 (Jun. 1971).
12. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-329b (1969), as amended Pub. Act No. 5. § 126(a)(2) (Jun.
1971), provides that an unmarried student shall be classified as a non-resident, or out-of-state
student if his "legal address for any part of the one-year period immediately prior to his
application for admission at a constituent unit of the state system of higher education was
outside of Connecticut."
§ 126(a)(3) provides that a married student, if living with his spouse, shall be classified as
out-of-state if his "legal address at the time of his application for admission to such a unit
was outside of Connecticut."
13. The classifications detailed in note 12 supra are rendered permanent and irrebuttable
for the entire period of time during which the student remains at the university. CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 10-329b (1969), as amended Pub. Act No. 5, § 126(a)(5) (Jun. 1971):
The status of a student, as established at the time of his application for admission at
a constituent unit of the state system of higher education under the provisions of this
section, shall be his status for the entire period of his attendance at such constituent
unit.
It is this portion of the statute which the Court pinpoints as unconstitutional.
14. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Equal protection doctrines of "strict judicial scrutiny" and "compelling state interest" are henceforth reserved for analysis of a statute which "operates to the
disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution.

.

." Id. at 17.
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the right to education is not "fundamental" and thus not sheltered by the
tests of "strict judicial scrutiny" and "compelling state interest" under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Any direct reliance
upon the right to education is thus proscribed; Rodriguez dictates that the
Vlandis challenge be predicated upon other constitutional grounds. The
determination of whether the right of interstate travel is substantially
impeded by the imposition of a durational residence requirement, a basis
previously adopted by the Court," is not squarely presented. Vlandis does
not examine the constitutionally vulnerable resident/non-resident classification, but rather focuses on the procedural means" through which the
17
suspect classification is ascertained.
15. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Shapiro]. Shapiro propounds the right of interstate travel, terming it
fundamental and hence invocative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Under the more stringent, "new" equal protection standards recently espoused by the
Warren Court, a state classification based upon inherently suspect criteria such as wealth or
race, or which impairs a fundamental right will be upheld only if necessary to advance some
compelling state interest. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The
Shapiro Court, placing the right of interstate travel within the protective sweep of the equal
protection clause, held that the right was substantially impeded by the imposition of a oneyear durational residence requirement upon newly-arrived citizens seeking to qualify for state
welfare assistance. Although the opinion includes an oft-cited, limiting footnote (394 U.S. at
638 n.21) which expressly withholds judgment on the validity of residency requirements in
determining eligibility for tuition-free education, it cannot negate the thrust of the implied
parallel to education:
We do not perceive why a mother who is seeking to make a new life for herself and her
children should be regarded as less deserving because she considers, among others
[sic] factors, the level of a State's public assistance. Surely such a mother is no less
deserving than a mother who moves into a particularState in order to take advantage
of its better educationalfacilities. 394 U.S. at 632 (emphasis added).
Three years later in Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, the Court examined the impact of a residence requirement which limited the right to vote in state 'elections. The Court again focused
on the right of interstate travel, reasoning by analogy to Shapiro that this fundamental right
was impaired by a law which postponed the interstate traveler's right to vote in state elections. "Durational residence laws impermissibly condition and penalize the right to travel by
imposing their prohibitions on only those persons who have recently exercised that right."
405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972). See generally Note, Residence Requirements after Shapiro v.
Thompson, 70 COLUM. L. Rav. 134, 152 (1970); Comment, The Demise of the Durational
Residence Requirement, 26 Sw. L.J. 538 (1972).
16. "Whether the courts use the words "conclusive presumption of law", "presumption of
law", or some other expression, the result is the same, the rule being one of substantive law
rather than one governing the burden of proof or the duty of going forward with evidence."
United States v. Provident Trust Co., 291 U.S. 272, 273 (1934).
17. Justices White and Marshall each authored concurring opinions disputing the Court's
choice of ratio decidendi. Vlandis v. Kline, 93 S. Ct. 2230, 2238 (1973) (White, J., concurring).
Mr. Justice Marshall, citing Shapiro and Blumstein, would favor an equal protection analysis
of tuition residency laws:

1974]

RECENT DECISIONS

Appellant Connecticut terms the tuition differential system a reasonable
means of securing cost equalization between out-of-state students and
Connecticut residents, who have contributed to the cost of the state university through taxes. 18 By freezing the student's residential status as of the
time he applies, Connecticut argues, the state's residents are assured of
their rightful subsidy. The Court rejects this argument, pointing to the fact
that the conclusive presumption instead denies this subsidy to certain of
its bona fide, albeit newly-arrived, residents. Admitting this arguendo,
Connecticut further contends that it may justifiably discriminate between
old and new bona fide residents, again advancing past tax contribution 9
in justification. The Court replies that the legislature did not so phrase its
statute and thus may not now be heard to assert such a construction.
Lastly, Connecticut attempts to defend its challenged statute by citing its
administrative expediency; this the Court rejects, reaffirming that "the
Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency"."0
Chief Justice Burger, dissenting, terms the Court's very willingness to
Because the Court finds sufficient basis in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to dispose of the constitutionality of the Connecticut statute here at issue,
it has no occasion to address the serious equal protection questions raised by this and
other tuition residency laws. Id. at 2238 (Marshall, J., concurring).
18. Cf. Clarke v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Iowa 1966); Thompson v. Board of
Regents, 187 Neb. 252, 188 N.W.2d 840 (1971).
19. Shapiro clearly forbids the advancement of past tax contributions as justification for
discrimination against newly-arrived citizens:
Appellants argue further that the challenged classification may be sustained as an
attempt to distinguish between new and old residents on the basis of the contribution
they have made to the community through the payment of taxes ....

Appellants'

reasoning would logically permit the State to bar new residents from schools, parks,
and libraries or deprive them of police and fire protection. Indeed it would permit the
State to apportion all benefits and services according to the past tax contributions of
its citizens. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits such an apportionment of state
services. 394 U.S. 618, 632-33 (1969).
Courts faced with the question of the constitutionality of higher tuition charges for nonresidents have generally sought to avoid the pervasive thrust of Shapiro by citing to the
limiting footnote (394 U.S. at 638 n.21, discussed in note 15 supra). Kirk v. Board of Regents,
273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 554 (1970), sought
to distinguish between the need for basic sustenance-food, clothing, shelter-at stake in
Shapiro and the luxury of attending a publicly-financed instituton of higher learning, upholding California's residence requirement. Cf. Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn.
1970), affd summarily, 401 U.S. 985 (1971). These cases sidestep the basic holding of
Shapiro-thata durational residence law per se infringes upon the right of interstate travel
and may only be vindicated by a compelling state interest. Dispositive is the issue of the
infringement upon the right, not the motivation behind the exercise of the right, be it the
procuring of larger welfare benefits or the desire to attend a state-supported university.
Indeed, Shapiro makes it plain that motive is to be considered irrelevant. 394 U.S. at 632
(quoted in note 15 supra).
20. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
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examine the operation and effect of the challenged statute equivalent to
the strict judicial scrutiny of an equal protection adjudication.' lFurther,
the Chief Justice disavows the majority's willingness to enter into the
delicate process of weighing the state's administrative convenience against
the gravity of denying the student the opportunity of proving bona fide
residence. Such a balancing process, argues Mr. Chief Justice Burger, is
central to the "compelling state interest" test and hence not properly
before the Vlandis Court.22
The importance of Vlandis is twofold. With respect to substantive content, the overturning of Connecticut's conclusive presumption of nonresidency is result-oriented; further, it is consistent with the attitude of
disfavor with which the Court has viewed the durational residence requirement in the aftermath of Shapiro. With respect to constitutional
theory, the Vlandis ruling evidences a focus upon the due process clause
as the constitutional tool selected to hasten the demise of the durational
residence requirement. The apparent invocation of equal protection doctrine by the majority widens the parameters of the due process clause2 and
perhaps betokens a new emphasis upon that clause as the striking arm of
the fourteenth amendment.

S. T.N.
21. "There will be, I fear, some ground for a belief that the Court now engrafts the 'close
judicial scrutiny' test onto the Due Process Clause whenever we deal with something like
'permanent irrebuttable presumptions'." Vlandis v. Kline, 93 S. Ct. 2230, 2241 (1973)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice's argument could have been circumvented had
the majority involved the equal protection clause as urged by Justices Marshall and White.
See note 17 supra. The Chief Justice laments the lack of a "genuine constitutional interest
truly worthy of the standard of close judicial scrutiny", 93 S. Ct. at 2240; the right of
interstate travel, pronounced fundamental by Shapiro and Blumstein, could serve as the
nucleus for an equal protection challenge of tuition residency laws. By relying on the right of
interstate travel, viewing the durational residence requirement as an impermissible penalty
upon the exercise of that right, the Rodriguez consideration of whether education itself is a
fundamental right is rendered unnecessary.
22. 93 S. Ct. 2230, 2240 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting):
The Court . . . seems . . . to accomplish a transferrence [sic] of the elusive and
arbitrary "compelling state interest" concept into the orbit of the Due Process Clause.
Chief Justice Burger further stated that:
The doctrinal difficulties of the Equal Protection Clause are indeed trying, but today
the Court makes an uncharted drift toward complications for the Due Process Clause
comparable in scope and seriousness with those we are encountering in the equal
protection area. Can this be what we are headed for? Id. at 2241.
23. Even more strongly opposing the due process ratio decidendi of the majority holding,
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief Justice and by Mr. Justice Douglas, terms the
opinion a return to pre-Holmesian doctrines of substantive due process. Id. at 2244, (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

